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Deterrence On display: Missile
defences could dissuade adversaires
from acquiring ballistic missiles (©
AFSOUTH)
Missile defence on NATO's
agenda
 Dr David S. Yost  01 September 2006
In anticipation of the Riga Summit, David S. Yost analyses the
issues behind NATO's debate on missile defence.
The deployment of missile
defences has become one of the
first steps to be taken when a
NATO Ally is threatened during a
crisis. The Alliance, for example,
sent Patriot missile defences to
Turkey during the 1990-1991 and
2003 conflicts involving Iraq.
Moreover, NATO has a history of successful cooperation in missile
defence for the protection of its forces in the field, and it is improving
this capability. In March 2005 the North Atlantic Council launched
the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD)
programme. ALTBMD will integrate various theatre missile defence
systems into a coherent network for the protection of deployed forces,
with an initial operational capability in 2010. 
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in the Alliance's missile defence capability. When NATO's defence
ministers met in June 2006, they took note of the completion of the
missile defence feasibility study that the Alliance had launched at the
2002 Prague Summit to examine options for the protection of Alliance
territory, forces and population centres. 
The question of the technical feasibility of such defences against
ballistic missiles has become less salient than the political-military
issues, which are still under discussion. Within this debate it is
increasingly accepted that "full-spectrum" missile defences - that is,
against all missile ranges - could serve Alliance security interests.
Despite efforts to discourage and contain missile proliferation, the
numbers of ballistic missiles outside NATO (and their range and
sophistication) are increasing, and these missiles could be equipped
with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Moreover, terrorists and
offensive missiles may constitute overlapping challenges, as
Hezbollah's connections with Syria and Iran have demonstrated with
short-range systems. 
Threat assessment - forecasting the requirement for missile defence -
is obviously not an exact science. How serious (and how imminent)
are long-range ballistic missile threats in relation to the costs of
procuring missile defences and pursuing other defence priorities? The
general threat assessment among Allied governments is not fully in
agreement with that of the US government, notably with regard to the
time-scale on which foreign ballistic missile capabilities may mature.
However, it is widely acknowledged that the availability of assets
could change rapidly with transfers from a foreign supplier such as
North Korea and that intentions could shift overnight with a change of
regime. Moreover, even with poor accuracy and uncertain technical
reliability, WMD-armed long-range ballistic missiles could pose
significant threats to NATO countries. 
Missile defences protecting NATO cities and territory could in
principle reinforce deterrence, enable the Alliance to navigate crises
with greater steadiness and solidarity, and (perhaps in some cases)
even dissuade adversaries from acquiring ballistic missiles that could
be used to threaten Allied homelands. Missile defences could bolster
11/2/21, 3'10 PMNATO Review - Missile defence on NATO's agenda
Page 3 of 8https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2006/09/01/missile-defence-on-nato-s-agenda/index.html
deterrence because an adversary would face the risk of operational
defeat of his attack as well as the prospect of NATO's retaliation.
Moreover, with defences against such ballistic missiles, the Allies
would be freer to consider options other than preventive or pre-
emptive action against adversaries. Such defences could help the
Allies reach consensus on strategy in a crisis and hold together during
a conflict. Missile defence capabilities could also offer signalling
possibilities in a crisis. NATO governments could exercise the option
of announcing an increase in the missile defence alert level to send a
message of cohesion, determination, and preparedness. The
employment of Patriot to protect Israel from Iraqi missile attacks in
1991 demonstrated that missile defences can be employed for
purposes of de-escalation, conflict limitation, and crisis management.
Resolving practical questions
The potential advantages have, however, often been lost from sight as
experts and officials have debated the many unresolved questions
associated with missile defence. These questions include command
and control, the prioritisation of scarce missile defence assets, the
prospect of continuing (and even deepened) Allied dependence on US
capabilities, liability for debris from successful interceptions of
WMD-armed enemy missiles, enemy response options, technology
transfer, cost, threat assessment, missile defence architecture
priorities, and possible reactions by Russia. 
Command and control for defences against ballistic missile attack
cannot be effectively improvised in the midst of a crisis. The
arrangements must be thought through and agreed upon in
deliberations far in advance, with clear rules of engagement spelled
out for the military commander to whom authority to act in the event
of ballistic missile attack would be delegated. In practice, this
commander would almost certainly be an American, perhaps the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The rules of
engagement could be determined through Alliance consultations and
the operation of the missile defences could include Allied
contributions.
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Such command and
consultations arrangements
could address questions of
prioritisation and debris. For
instance, how would the
Allies determine which
assets should be defended
with priority in particular
contingencies? Would
national capitals or the
largest population centres be defended first? Would precedence be
given to nations in a coalition of NATO allies undertaking a specific
operation? What about defending neutral and non-NATO countries?
Would some interceptors be dedicated exclusively to the defence of
Europe or North America? NATO has recognised these issues, but has
not yet reached conclusions. The need to determine priorities for
limited defensive assets stands out as an important question for
Alliance consultations. 
Another command and control issue that requires more analysis is
debris, in view of the risk that fragments of an intercepted warhead
might fall on the territory of a non-NATO country or a NATO country
that was itself not the object of the attack and that had no direct role in
the engagement decision. Potential debris damage should be
compared with the consequences of a ballistic missile attack
conducted as intended. Not one piece of debris from the Columbia
shuttle hit a human being, and the shuttle was much bigger than a
warhead, which would be (unlike the Columbia shuttle) pulverised
into bits by a non-nuclear kinetic interception. In the case of an
exoatmospheric intercept, therefore, debris would be likely to burn up
entirely during re-entry. Even if the enemy employed a nuclear
warhead designed to explode on interception and thereby cause an
electro-magnetic pulse (EMP), which is not a simple design task, the
damaging effects of a high-altitude EMP burst would (although
significant) almost certainly be much less than those of a nuclear
attack against a city. Beyond the vast immediate destruction, a
successful nuclear attack would produce fallout and impose
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Witney, then a British official, may have had these consequences in
mind when he wrote in 2003, "No European state, I hope, would
refuse to run the risk of a debris shower from a successful interception
falling on its territory, if this was the price to be paid for protecting a
friend or ally, near or far, from ballistic missile strike." 
The Russian offensive deterrent would not be threatened by US or
NATO missile defences in Europe, because these defences would
involve only a small number of interceptors. Despite criticism from
Russian commentators, consultations with Moscow and transparency
measures might clear up possible misunderstandings about the
purpose and potential functions of these interceptors. In fact, since
2002 NATO and Russia have been engaged in theatre missile defence
cooperation and dialogue. 
The issue of the response options open to adversaries is related to
threat assessment. Ballistic missiles are seen by those pursuing them
as useful for various purposes - deterrence, coercion, and prestige, as
well as strike options. Ballistic missile defences might nonetheless
drive some adversaries to consider other attack options, such as
manned aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or
bombs hidden in ships in harbours. In the last case, there would be no
defence, if maritime surveillance failed, other than the threat of
identifying who planted the bomb and (as with declared deterrence
policy) punishing the guilty party. Raising the issue of an adversary's
circumvention options is a paradoxical tribute to missile defences, in
that it implies that these defences might succeed in dissuading the
adversary from seeking ballistic missiles. Adversaries determined to
rely on ballistic missiles might shop for Russian- and Chinese-
developed penetration aids and other countermeasures, but could not
be sure of defeating technologies designed to identify and overcome
them. 
It is precisely because other means of attack are possible that NATO is
examining improved defences against manned aircraft, cruise
missiles, and UAVs. Except for short-range interceptors, ballistic
missile defence is practically useless against cruise missiles. With the
proliferation of access to technologies, actual and hypothetical threats
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are expanding. Allied governments must make choices and keep in
mind the risk that investing heavily in defence against one form of
attack might leave NATO exposed in another domain. 
The most serious cost issue may not be the fact that adversaries have
multiple attack options but that the defence spending of most Allied
governments is at low levels and these governments have other urgent
military priorities. In recent years they have emphasised current
operations, particularly in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and
transformational issues related to the NATO Response Force. Many
Allies would probably be reluctant to commit to common funding of a
major new procurement programme, and see advantages in
postponing such a decision while Alliance experts grapple with the
various unresolved questions, particularly since answers to some of
these questions may depend on technological advances. For example,
sophisticated discrimination, tracking, and trajectory-projection
capabilities may make it possible to design command and control
arrangements that would optimise intercept opportunities and
minimise the risk of debris.
Ways forward
It is not clear whether at the November 2006 Riga Summit the Allies
will go beyond the call for "further work on political-military
considerations" made by NATO defence ministers in June 2006.
However, the Summit may provide guidance on analytical and
practical steps forward, perhaps including the establishment of a
NATO Headquarters Missile Defence Centre. 
Moreover, it is possible that the United States and a few other NATO
Allies will go forward with "full-spectrum" missile defences without
waiting for the Alliance as a whole to make a procurement decision.
The main precedents for this in NATO theatre missile defence include
the SAMP-T programme involving France and Italy; the Patriot
programmes involving Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
States; and the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS)
programme involving Germany, Italy, and the United States. SAMP-T,
Patriot and MEADS all defend against shorter-range missiles. To
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counter long-range missile threats to Europe and North America, the
United States may work with some NATO Allies to deploy a missile
defence site in Europe. (This would be the third site after the US sites
with ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska and California. It
might be more accurately termed "the first European site.") The site
with interceptor missiles would be supported by other sites in Europe
for sensors and communications, and it could offer protection to much
of NATO Europe and North America against long-range ballistic
missile threats originating in the Middle East. 
If the United States and some other NATO Allies go forward with
"full-spectrum" missile defences with a set of bilateral programmes of
cooperation, this may accelerate the Alliance's collective decision-
making about missile defence. As in some other areas of Alliance
policy, all the Allies may well be involved in consultations, even if
only a few participate directly in the practical arrangements. NATO
communications could link together national, multinational, and
Alliance missile defence efforts. Coordination of national
programmes and those involving groups of allies with NATO-wide
efforts is essential to preserve Alliance unity. 
The US is already sharing missile launch information with NATO and
other allies. A missile defence arrangement pioneered by the United
States and other NATO Allies could give all the Allies insight into
capabilities and operational principles, including changing readiness
conditions. A US-led missile defence system in cooperation with
selected allies could consist of ground-based interceptor missiles
networked with other capabilities (such as THAAD, Patriot, and
Aegis) to offer a measure of protection to the Alliance as a whole. The
system might be paid for mainly by the United States, with the
contributions in Europe consisting of funding, real estate, national
sensors and missile defence systems, and/or support staff, including
for force protection. Full-spectrum protection for NATO European
cities and territory might well include significant ALTBMD
components, because networking among sensors and interceptors is
essential for a comprehensive architecture to defend against short- as
well as long-range missiles. 
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An expression of NATO support for "full-spectrum" missile defence
would reassure potential host nations that a US missile defence site in
Europe would not be divisive or a source of disputes with other
nations. Indeed, such NATO support, along with consultations with
Russia, could help to create a positive framework for future missile
defence cooperation among the Allies and could be seen by potential
adversaries as a sign of Alliance resolve.
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